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Power and knowledge in the Agricultural Lending Division  
of the Fiji Development Bank  
 
Abstract  
Purpose of the paper:  This paper exposes the gap between rationalist 
banking theory and actual practice within the Agricultural Lending Division 
of the Fiji Development Bank (FDB) by focusing on the inter-relationship 
between power and knowledge.   
Design/methodology/approach:  Data for this qualitative research project 
was gathered from archived documents, interviews, observation and 
reflection. A Foucauldian theoretical framework was used, which 
acknowledged the impact of social, economic and political factors within 
the bank’s historical context. 
Findings:  In practice non-rationalist factors play a vital role in decision 
making and the development of mechanisms of accountability within the 
FDB. The bank’s policies and procedures have ultimately had to strike a 
delicate balance between the Fijian government’s development goals, 
profitability requirements and the formal rationalities of new public 
management, and the cultural realities of agricultural lending in Fiji’s 
traditional community-oriented society.  
Research implications:  This study refutes a merely technocratic approach 
to banking research, opening up possibilities for further studies which focus 
on power within a socio-historic context.  
Practical implications: The findings of this study challenge banks to 
acknowledge the subjectivity of their lending processes and to improve the 
accountability of lending officers.  
Original/value of the paper:  This paper demonstrates the credibility and 
usefulness of a theoretically driven qualitative research study in making 
visible issues that would otherwise be hidden.  
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knowledge; theory and practice; disciplinary surveillance 
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Power and knowledge in the Agricultural Lending Division  
of the Fiji Development Bank  
Introduction  
Since a commercial bank’s primary source of revenue is from its lending activities (Rose and 
Hudgins 2005; Saythe et al 2003; Weaver 1994; De Lucia and Peters 1998), its ability to 
negotiate loans successfully is therefore integral to its achievement of the profitability 
necessary to maintain and increase investor confidence. Loans are negotiated in a competitive 
environment, often with low profit margins and high risk, so banks have learned to employ 
credit risk models1 in order to hedge against defaults. This technical-rational view of banking 
assumes organizational survival requires “the development of internal structures which best 
meet the needs of the organization’s environment” and emphasizes economic efficiency and 
rationality, since organizational behaviour is driven by “a calculus of the most efficient means 
to accomplish given ends” (Sharma and Hoque 2002, 343).  
Unlike commercial banks, a development bank is established in an institutional setting where 
other contextual parameters are intertwined with rationalist techniques. The risks associated 
with the lending operations of a development bank are heightened, since security is minimal, 
and the return on lending is considerably lower than that earned from commercial loans 
(Sathye et al 2003). These factors make commercial bank lending models less appropriate in a 
development bank context (Brown et al 1989; Hogan et al 2004).  
The Fiji Development Bank (FDB) was established in 1967 to enhance the development of 
the Fijian economy in areas such as agriculture, manufacturing, fishing, and the financing of 
small projects and special loans to encourage indigenous Fijians into the commercial and 
industrial sectors (Fiji Development Bank Annual Report 1967, 1). As a development bank, its 
role is to grant development loans that would not be commercially viable. This study focuses 
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on the interplay between traditional bank lending models and the actual practice of the FDB’s 
Agricultural Lending Division (ALD), highlighting the gap between theory and practice. By 
analysing the FDB’s practice through a Foucauldian perspective (Foucault 1977a), the 
complexity of social, historical, economic and political factors is acknowledged and the 
relationship between power and knowledge is made explicit.  
The paper first outlines the conduct of the qualitative study, urging the employment of theory 
in qualitative research, describing and defending the applicability of the Foucauldian 
framework to a banking study. It then describes the culture and history of Fiji as they relate to 
the exercise of power and discipline between the FDB and its constituents. A description and 
analysis of the power and knowledge dynamics of three critical events in the history of the 
FDB follows, with conclusions being drawn about the significance of power and knowledge 
in the disciplinary surveillance undertaken by the bank.  
A qualitative study with a Foucauldian emphasis 
This interpretation of the history and events of the FDB is informed by Foucault’s writings. 
Since a Foucauldian view emphasizes the power, knowledge and surveillance dynamics of an 
organization’s history, the FDB was studied within these parameters. Archival documents 
covering a thirty-year period were studied, including annual reports, the minutes of meetings, 
policy papers, and relevant Fijian banking legislation. Structured, semi-structured and 
informal interviews with bank personnel, observation of bank operations and systems, and 
reflection on the apparent dynamics and power structures inherent within the bank were 
undertaken. Given the nature of the FDB and its operations, confidentiality was a major issue 
(Irvine 2003), and imposed particular constraints on the conduct of the project. From outside 
the bank, interviews were conducted with personnel from government, the Fijian Reserve 
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Bank and farmers who were given loans by the FDB’s agricultural loans division. Any 
research is value-laden, and observation is “never (theoretically) unstructured” Tinker (2005, 
105). It is acknowledged that the adoption of a Foucauldian framework brought subjectivity 
to this study which permeated the entire process, from the gathering of the data, through to its 
interpretation, as aspects of power, knowledge and surveillance were considered at each stage 
of the research process.  
Qualitative academic research without theorizing merely tells a story, fails to identify and 
interpret important social issues, and can fall into the trap of claiming more objectivity than it 
ought, since every researcher interprets qualitative data through some subjective lens, whether 
it is stated overtly or not (Chua 1986). The use of a Foucauldian framework therefore 
represents an attempt to analyze “why the organization did as it did”, not merely to report 
what it did, and in doing that, is unashamedly subjective (Lynch 2004, 130). It could be 
argued that within any social context, human behaviour is inextricably linked with dimensions 
of power and discipline, and consequently there has been a great deal of academic research to 
which a Foucauldian lens has been applied.  In spite of the fact that banking, particularly bank 
lending, even at a superficial level, contains a disciplinary element, the authors are unaware of 
any study undertaken on banking which uses a Foucauldian framework.  
Rather than being merely the “value added” of qualitative academic research Llewellyn 
(2003, 662), the use of any theoretical approach is a direct acknowledgment that a particular 
lens is being applied intentionally at every level of the research project. By focusing on the 
social discourse that Foucault identified as significant, discipline, power and knowledge, this 
study produces a unique qualitative research “story” about the FDB’s ALD which offers 
insights about the emergence of bank lending as an instrument of disciplinary power and 
surveillance. As a story, not the story, it pays less attention to issues other researchers might 
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identify as important. Other studies of the same organisation, approached from a different 
theoretical framework, will produce “different research outputs” (Irvine and Deo 2006, 206). 
Alam et al (2004), for example, adopted a Marxist view and applied Giddens’ structuration 
theory to the FDB, and in doing so highlighted the contradictions existing between Fijian 
cultures and the profit-maximising motives of a bank. A Foucauldian lens, therefore, will 
affect theorizing at any level Llewellyn (2003, 667). The authors identify a Foucauldian 
approach as a context-related theory according to Llewellyn’s (2003) five levels of theorizing. 
While not a world view (or meta-theory) like Marxism, it can nevertheless be embedded in 
context, and does set up contradictions, identify concepts and make possible the use of 
metaphors. 
Michel Foucault’s writings2 deal with issues of social behaviour in areas such as psychology, 
criminology, mental illness and medicine. Within case study settings, he interpreted these 
human sciences through a lens whose focus was the conjoined nature of power and 
knowledge (Foucault 1977a, 52), thus providing valuable insights into the historical 
development of social order. Power, conceived as a set of techniques and disciplinary 
practices, involved a shifting network of alliances, and was intertwined with knowledge. 
Knowledge and power together made it possible to watch the behaviour of those under 
surveillance, thus reinforcing existing systems of discipline and oppression.  
It could be argued that within any social context, human behaviour has many dimensions, and 
whether or not one agrees with every aspect of Foucault’s writings, his framework of power, 
knowledge and disciplinary surveillance offers useful insights into social and organizational 
behaviour3. Consequently there has been a great deal of academic research to which a 
Foucauldian lens has been applied4, but significantly, not in the area of banks and their 
accounting and lending systems. A study of the relationship between power and knowledge 
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provides a helpful vehicle through which to examine in more detail a bank’s lending 
processes, since banking is a practice which takes place within an historically determined 
culture and is informed as much by social convention as by mathematical and financial 
calculations. Power and knowledge therefore play an integral role in a prospective lender’s 
ability to secure a loan, and in the bank’s disciplinary surveillance after the loan has been 
granted. This paper will demonstrate that any study of bank lending mechanisms which 
ignores dynamics of power can only provide an impoverished understanding and analysis of 
banking practice.  
Figure 1 provides a diagrammatic representation of Foucault’s concepts, and applies them to 
the case of the FDB. Disciplinary surveillance within the Foucauldian framework is achieved 
through the existence and interplay of power and knowledge. The FDB had the major 
responsibility for oversight of the loans it granted to farmers. This was exercised and achieved 
by the loans officers, working with the village chiefs, who conducted their own disciplinary 
surveillance through the traditional village hierarchical structure. Their knowledge gave them 
power. The two were inextricably linked. The farmers themselves had knowledge of crops 
and the land, and they also had power, because under existing system, there was little that 
could be done by the FDB if they did default on their loans. The FDB system worked with the 
village system.  
Insert Figure 1 here. 
Foucault’s concern is to identify historical patterns, which contribute to the discourse of 
power and knowledge. Three significant events in the history of the FDB have been 
identified, and these become the basis of an historically informed discourse: the establishment 
of the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board (AILB) in 1951, the institution of the FDB in 
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1967 and the adoption of the FDB’s new corporate plan in 1994. Interactions between 
lenders, Fijian chiefs and borrowers will be shown to be significant, as power and knowledge 
work together within a system of disciplinary surveillance, not only by lending officers, but of 
lending officers, by the FDB itself.  First the unique culture and history of Fiji, as it relates to 
these events, will be described. 
Fijian culture and history: power and discipline through land and 
traditional authority 
The Fijian banking system can only be understood in the context of the social, economic and 
political significance of the village system, where land ownership was community-based, 
being leased only with the authority of the chief. This co-operative focus dates from before 
colonisation by the British in the 19th century. Fiji was originally settled by migrating 
Melanesians and Polynesians (Derrick 1946; Lloyd 1982), and later by Tongans and 
Tahitians, who brought with them their own traditions of power and knowledge, such as the 
chief system. The village social structure was clearly defined, from the chief at the top of the 
hierarchy to the warrior at the bottom (Alam et al 2004, 141 – 142). Various rituals, such as 
the grog drinking ceremony (yaqona), whereby contracts or disputes were settled with the 
village chief and other villagers in attendance, played an important part in this hierarchy. As 
part of Fijian culture, traditional ceremonies such as this provide an indispensable means of 
disciplinary surveillance. From a Foucauldian perspective, this is seen as the imposition of 
overt and covert regulatory regimes. The chiefs’ power to control the use of the land, 
illustrates this concept, since land was seen as more than a commodity, but as having tribal 
and spiritual significance. The village chiefs therefore played a vital role in the preservation 
of their land owning units. This was to prove significant in their dealings with the FDB.  
Later, Fiji attracted the attention of Europeans when early navigators such as Tasman (in 
1643), Cook (in 1774) and Bligh (in 1789) mapped the islands (Donnelly and Kerr 1976).  
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The traditional power structures of the chief system and land ownership came under threat 
when the British colonised Fiji in 1874. The traditional village social structure had been 
clearly defined, from the chief at the top of the hierarchy to the warrior at the bottom (Alam et 
al 2004, 141 – 142). The primary mandate of the first British-appointed Governor of Fiji was 
that the cost of administration would be paid out of the revenue derived from the Fijian 
economy (Ali 1980; Watters 1969), specifically from the sugar industry. In order to access 
both the land and the disciplinary authority necessary to supervise sugar cultivation and foster 
this development, the British formed an alliance with the Fijian chiefs, which resulted in an 
injection of European emphases on productivity and wealth generation into Fijian society and 
culture. While the chiefs maintained their authority in a village setting, it was with the 
permission of the British rulers. Thus, by harnessing the power and knowledge of the chiefs, 
the British were able to pursue their own interests.  
During the late 1800s, land, once communally owned, became a marketable commodity5. In 
the mid 1800s, the British had introduced a system of indentured Indian labourers in order to 
achieve their economic objectives (Scarr 1980; Ali 1980). This had ramifications later, when 
Indians became land owners and threatened to displace native Fijians (Qalo 1984; Alam et al 
2004). The new colonial government, in order to protect its economic plans, recognized the 
necessity of maintaining alliances with the chiefs, and therefore took steps to protect the 
customary land owners by creating the Native Land Commission (NLC) in 1874 (Ward 1965, 
121). The prime task of the NLC, replaced by the Native Land Trust Board in 1946, was to 
negotiate land leasing agreements on behalf of the Fijian people, and later to manage native 
land and act as an agency for the land owners6. By limiting the power of the chiefs to promote 
their own tribes’ interests, it represented a new form of disciplinary surveillance, brought 
about by land ownership arrangements, which provided rental income to land owners, and 
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opened up previously unused land to satisfy the government’s desire for a stronger 
agricultural base7.  
However, while these measures protected land ownership, they did not solve the problem of 
investment in agriculture-related projects. The commercial banks, with their emphasis on 
profitability and security, were unable to grant loans for agricultural lending to the extent that 
Fiji required if it were to develop its agricultural potential. Without government subsidies, 
agricultural loans simply were not viable in a commercial sense. There was a need for another 
structure which would make possible agricultural loans that would otherwise be outside the 
parameters of commercial bank lending. The next three sections focus on the three significant 
events already identified. 
The establishment of the Agricultural and Industrial Loans Board  
In 1951 the Fijian Government, recognizing the importance of agricultural and industrial 
development to the growth of its economy, established the AILB under Ordinance Number 27 
(Fiji Development Bank Annual Report 1967). The AILB was to provide facilities for the 
granting of agricultural and industrial credit, distributing funds provided by the government 
for that purpose. Applications for loans were invited in 1952, and by the end of that year, 267 
applications had been received and scrutinised by the Inspector of Loans, who was appointed 
in 1953. Out of the applications received in 1952, 9 were for industrial purposes, and 258 
were for agricultural projects (Fiji Development Bank Annual Report 1967, 3 - 4). Of those 
initial applications, 75 loans were approved in 1953, for an outlay of ₤147,994, a vast amount 
of money in Fiji at the time (Fiji Development Bank Annual Report 1967, 3 – 4). The Fijian 
village chiefs, with their inherent knowledge of loan applicants and traditional values, 
exercised considerable power by advising the Board about whether loans should be granted or 
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denied. They also provided disciplinary surveillance by assisting the loans officers in gauging 
the actual performance of successful loan applicants as the loan funds were disbursed.  
The AILB made a positive beginning in its endeavour to promote agricultural development, 
but it proved to be merely a transitional era in Fiji’s development banking history. During the 
1950s and early 1960s, as there was more demand placed on the economy for agricultural 
development, the AILB’s limited capabilities in terms of bureaucratic machinery and trained 
personnel became apparent. There was a distinct lack of skills in the employees of the AILB, 
a lack of government funding, and the organisational structure was unable to cope with the 
greater demands of the government’s agricultural ambitions. There was thus a need for an 
agricultural bank that would better manage the long term agricultural borrowing needs of 
farmers and foster Fiji’s national development goals (Fiji Development Bank Annual Report 
1967). The need for a larger-scale Development Bank with broader legislated powers and 
authority was also acknowledged in the Beuttle Report of 1965 (Fiji Development Bank 
Annual Report (1967, 2 – 5). In 1966, the Fijian Legislative Council unanimously approved 
the establishment of the FDB, and all the assets, liabilities, loan accounts and staff members 
of the AILB were transferred to the new bank.  
The institution of the Fiji Development Bank  
The extended powers of the FDB, bestowed by The Fiji Development Bank Act of 1967 (and 
later amendments in 1985), included the ability to subscribe to stocks, shares, bonds and 
debentures, to sell shares, and to invest in, and at the same time manage, any project 
considered by the bank to benefit the economy of Fiji. Significantly, the bank could also 
accept deposits and carry on the business of banking, thus fulfilling a role as both a 
development and commercial bank. Its main lending activities, however, were, and still are, 
conducted by the ALD, whose purpose is to meet the need for agricultural projects8 which 
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typically do not satisfy a commercial bank’s profit aspirations. Traditionally the AILB had 
lent to small-scale projects, which were village-based. As the government increased its 
emphasis on large-scale agricultural projects, these smaller projects were less attractive since 
they were unable to conduct large scale agricultural projects profitably. The FDB’s 
agricultural lending policy thus became a major factor in the Fijian government’s economic 
development plans, necessitating an effective disciplinary surveillance system which 
acknowledged the power of the chiefs in the achievement of specified economic targets:    
(l)ending to viable agricultural projects has always been an important activity of 
the bank and will continue to receive priority to ensure we continue to fulfil our 
role as development financiers for the nation (Fiji Development Bank Annual 
Report 1993, 5). 
The FDB was able to take up agricultural investment opportunities and risks that private 
commercial lending institutions would not be prepared to undertake (Fiji Development Bank 
Annual Report 1974, 2), since it relied heavily on the government to subsidise its activities. 
These investment opportunities could be either for small agricultural holdings such as copra 
plantations, or for major agricultural development projects, such as the establishment or 
expansion of a large sugar cane farm. The FDB’s ALD ultimately became the backbone of its 
entire lending portfolio, with the number and value of loans approved increasing steadily 
from 1967 – 8 until 1996 - 79. 
The most important of these schemes were those developed to foster the sugar industry, 
including the Seaqaqa Cane Scheme and the Ra Cane Development Scheme10, designed to 
encourage Fijians into sugar cane farming. In 1976, the FDB opened a branch in the Seaqaqa 
sugar cane growing area, with the result that farmers could now enjoy direct access to the 
bank and its services, and receive advice and help with the relevant documentation to speed 
their loan applications. This enhanced disciplinary surveillance exercised by bank personnel. 
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Under the ‘Yalavou Beef Development Scheme’, another lending initiative, the FDB involved 
local Fijian land owners in cattle raising and beef production in order to increase rural 
participation in the national economy. Other agricultural loans were given for rice farming, 
fishing and copra production, each of which had its own problems, due to the vagaries of the 
weather, harsh farming conditions11, and lack of expertise on the part of the farmers.  
The FDB provided loans to the Fijian holders of these leases on the assumption they would 
fulfil their repayment obligations. However the Fijian farmers knew that even if they 
defaulted on their repayments, the bank was powerless to enforce its lending agreements. 
Loans outstanding on Class “J” leases12 grew substantially until by 31 October 1995, the total 
amount outstanding comprised 750 accounts or 15% of total agricultural lending with a total 
value of Fijian $9.9 million (Fiji Development Bank Annual Report 1996). Since this category 
of land was leased only to native Fijians, and was known to be unproductive, the FDB was 
aware the loans were not recoverable. From a Foucauldian perspective, in this case the power 
and knowledge were vested in the local chiefs and their villagers, working with the FDB in 
implementing government policy relating to the use of Fijian land. One of the reasons for this 
was the high cost of field visits, because of the inaccessibility of many of the farms. This 
caused disciplinary surveillance and accountability problems, and resulted in many farmers 
misusing their loans. If farmers defaulted on their loans, the bank could not sell the land to a 
non-Fijian and no Fijian wanted to buy such unproductive land. Furthermore, even if the land 
were sold it would fetch a very low price, so in most cases the bank had no option but to give 
the land back to the villagers.   
Given these realities and the constraints of land ownership, it is hardly surprising that the 
FDB suffered operating losses for its agricultural lending operations. One way in which the 
bank attempted to overcome these losses was to increase its lending surveillance in the form 
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of more onsite inspections. It was hoped that through the control FDB inspectors were able to 
exercise over farm management, better crops, harvests and improved repayment rates would 
eventuate, but these were not forthcoming. The military coup of 198713 had a profound effect 
on the bank’s ability to make a profit from its agricultural lending operations. In addition, 
between 1987 and 1994, the bank’s ability to sustain its operations under the generous 
lending provisions that existed at the time were constrained by land ownership requirements, 
as already mentioned. The bank’s ability to generate a profit from agricultural lending was 
also impaired by its lack of staff expertise, whereby professional advice was deficient, and 
surveillance of loans was conducted inexpertly. The prevalence of natural disasters, common 
in an island state such as Fiji, also made it difficult for farmers to achieve production targets 
when their entire crops were devastated regularly. These were crucial, particularly as the 
Fijian government was moving towards a westernised system of government, whereby the 
profitability of government lending was imperative. Under these circumstances, both the 
power and knowledge mechanisms were ineffective in achieving the government’s new 
agricultural economic development goals. An increase in the level of sophistication of bank 
personnel’s skills was necessary if this regulatory regime was to foster the government’s 
goals.  
The FDB’s Management by Objectives plan  
The FDB’s Management by Objectives (MBO) plan, introduced in 1994, was part of the 
Fijian government’s public sector reform policy, and was both the culmination of changing 
government attitudes to profitability, and a catalyst for major change in the bank’s 
agricultural lending policies. In keeping with globalised new public management practices 
(Sharma and Hoque 2002; Brown et al 2003), a private sector approach was adopted, where 
“government officials (were seen) as accountable managers who are empowered with a 
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particular responsibility” (Lodhia and Burritt 2004, 347). Thus the focus of the “new” FDB 
was to be on profitability. This created a tension between the traditional functions of a 
development bank, and a new expanded vision of a commercially viable development bank:  
… it is our special function to venture where others might be reluctant to go, to 
offer to help those who would not quality and to take risks that would be 
unacceptable to the commercial banks (Fiji Development Bank Newsletter 1995, 
1). 
On the other hand, a broadened perception of the role of a development bank was identified as 
breaking down preconceived notions and opening up new possibilities: 
… the trend is to go into other areas of lending; given that agriculture is one of the 
high risk areas in lending. By diversifying into commercial loans, we get a better 
return and we get to continue our role in agriculture by subsidising lending in this 
area (Fiji Development Bank Newsletter 1997, 4). 
In order to maximise profitability, the bank now required greater security from prospective 
lenders, a closer scrutiny of projects, and a requirement that loans ought to be commercially 
viable:  
… the bank is now more profit orientated which is based on actual performance 
indicators, for example, each lending officer is given a portfolio of clients and the 
success of the lending officer’s performance is based on how successful is the 
performance of his clients within the given portfolio (FDB employee). 
The FDB introduced new disciplinary surveillance mechanisms in order to attain the 
government’s agricultural objectives. For example, more stringent lending and repayment 
requirements were introduced, a greater emphasis was placed on applicants’ provision of 
security for loans was introduced, and more thorough follow up was instituted on loans at risk 
of default. This represented a change from traditional lending patterns, which involved the 
chiefs’ approval, and the new corporate rationality style of lending, based on profitability and 
long-term growth. The traditional public sector management style, which was “administration 
and custodianship of public resources” (Lodhia and Burritt 2004, 347, citing Hood 1995), 
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changed to a private sector approach, with government officials now viewed as “accountable 
managers … empowered with a particular responsibility” (Lodhia and Burritt 2004, 347, 
citing Hood 1995 and Parker and Gould 1999).  
The implications of Class J leases on the FDB’s ability to recover loans have already been 
highlighted. This lack of previous foresight in relation to the lending implications of land 
leases left the FDB in 1996 with an average loan of Fijian $3,001 outstanding, including 74 
farmers who were no longer producing anything, their only security being a crop lien and a 
bill of sale over the working bullocks and farm implements (Fiji Development Bank Annual 
Report 1996, 11). It was hardly surprising that in the new corporate culture, the terms and 
conditions of the loans would have to undergo significant changes.  
Loans on leased land comprised Fijian $43.7 million, 41% of the total agricultural loans 
granted by the FDB. If these agricultural leases were not renewed it would have a huge effect 
on the bank’s profitability, since the FDB had provided the necessary finance to farmers on 
the understanding that the lease would be renewed by the land owning units. The bank did not 
really have enough knowledge to read the hidden agenda or motives of the land owning units 
(Fijian villagers), and was not able to predict the future of the native leases. If the land leased 
to non-Fijians, primarily Indians, was not renewed before the expiry date, these farmers 
would be forced to sell their farms to the Fijian villagers, at a substantially lower market 
price. This was a disincentive for these farmers whose lease was about to expire and who 
were unable to obtain a renewal. The result was that Indian farmers who leased native land, 
reduced crop production, which also affected the bank’s ability to collect loan repayments. 
The bank’s security undertakings, in relation to the farm, would be valueless without the 
extension of the lease. Consequently, in 1996, as a result of the FDB’s new corporate plan, 
the policy on Class “J” leases was changed. All new loans within this category were 
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suspended because “…the performance of borrowers on Class “J” leases did not match that of 
other clients” (Fiji Development Bank Annual Report 1996, 11). 
Another factor which contributed towards the lack of profitability of agricultural lending was 
the inadequate management skills and commitment by some agricultural farmers. With the 
FDB’s new management style relying more heavily on profitability and commercialisation of 
the agricultural lending portfolio, this had to be addressed:  
(w)hat I can say is that historically, the bank relied heavily on its agricultural 
lending, however, the profits were low, this profit conflict has changed the overall 
focus of the bank with the introduction of the corporate plan is now on more 
commercial and industrial loans (FDB employee). 
New programs were devised which re-focused farmers’ energy and at the same time increased 
surveillance of the lending structures. By giving farmers more financial incentives in the form 
of better loan terms and conditions, and greater access to agricultural and financial training 
and advice, programmes such as the “sweat equity” policy of agricultural loan applications, 
which enabled farmers’ labour input to be counted as part of the security they offered when 
borrowing, were made viable. The FDB was therefore shifting the ultimate power and 
knowledge to perform from itself to the farmers. In contrast to the earlier system, where 
knowledge was based at a central location (the FDB) and was not disseminated to the farmers, 
farmers were now expected, with assistance, to determine which crops to plant, and which 
farm techniques to use in order to pay off their loans. Farmers now had to prove to the bank 
that they had performed adequately in relation to their loan. This involved reaching a certain 
performance target that was calculated by the farmer in consultation with the FDB’s lending 
officers. 
After the new management system of the FDB was introduced, and lending to agriculture was 
under the spotlight, the operation of the Fijian Farmers Co-operative Society Limited was 
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monitored more closely, and loan write-offs were assessed through a peer-review process. 
This inevitably shifted the dynamics of surveillance, power and knowledge between the 
various parties, the FDB itself, the ALD loans officers, the village chiefs and the farmers 
themselves. Before the MBO was introduced, the line of authority passed from the FDB to 
various lending divisions, each of which monitored the loans to farmers with the cooperation 
of the chiefs and other government agencies. The motivation was development, with little or 
no focus on the profitability of the loans, many of which defaulted. The new MBO, from a 
Foucauldian perspective, became a method of surveillance whereby each of the divisions of 
the FDB had to focus on specified profitability targets. Each of the divisions had to both 
acquire and obtain power and knowledge to help it achieve these targets. Greater pro-activity 
was required as part of the surveillance process, to ensure that loans did not default to the 
same extent as in the past. The role of the chiefs became more focused, to ensure that the 
farmers in their villages performed to expectations.   
The application of Foucauldian terminology to the case of the FDB, expressed 
diagrammatically in Figure 1, is summarised in more detail in Table I. Far from being a 
technical, objective process, the granting, monitoring and review of these loans has been 
demonstrated to involve the inter-dependence of power and knowledge, both of which are 
exercised at the levels of the FDB itself, and its officials, the tribal chiefs and the farmers: 
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… the concepts of power and knowledge are interrelated, interconnected … if you 
have the power then you have the knowledge, I have worked for the bank for the 
past (x) years and I can say that education experience gives you the power to 
undertake your responsibilities in the organisation, specially in the lending 
operations (an FDB lending officer). 
… power leads to knowledge and knowledge leads to power and both the 
concepts are interrelated within the development banking lending framework  (an 
FDB lending officer). 
Throughout the history of the FDB, embedded in the process by which agricultural loans were 
assessed, granted and monitored, were the formation of alliances and the exercise of 
disciplinary surveillance were exercised. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Conclusion 
This qualitative study of the FDB, which applies a Foucauldian framework, offers a 
theoretical interpretation that includes a focus on power. In doing that, it highlights the 
relative poverty of a mere technical description of lending dynamics. The interwoven 
dynamics of power and knowledge have been exposed within the bank’s practice, and Fijian 
social, economic, political, historic and organisational factors, instead of being ignored or 
discounted, have been acknowledged. The bank’s agricultural lending policies have been 
shown to involve more than the application of techniques. Instead, within the Fijian context, 
they have been shown to take into account wider social, political and economic conditions, as 
an ongoing interaction between the FDB on one hand and Fijian farmers on the other. The 
resulting disciplinary and surveillance mechanisms which were developed came about as a 
result of these historically informed discourses. The bank’s policies and procedures have 
ultimately had to strike a delicate balance between the Fijian government’s development 
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goals, profitability requirements and the formal rationalities of new public management, and 
the cultural realities of agricultural lending in Fiji’s traditional community-oriented society. 
A theoretically informed study such as this reduces the gap between theory and practice, as 
Foucault’s insights are contextualized and banking practice is shown to be determined by 
more than rationalist models. Banking literature is enriched by this challenge to embrace 
actual banking situations, as bank lending practices are shown to be the product, not only of 
desired lending models, but also of actual concrete social realities. Lending officers, who are 
both under disciplinary surveillance from above, and at the same provide that surveillance 
themselves, are the intermediaries through which this synthesis is achieved. It is their 
responsibility to ensure that bank policies and procedures are enforced within a challenging 
lending framework.  
Banking is not conducted in a vacuum, and particularly in the case of a development bank, the 
social, political and historical dynamics affect the way in which loans are granted and 
administered. The shift in the case of the FDB, to a more profit-oriented approach, underlines 
this, and demonstrates the effect of the outworking of government policy on the people who 
ultimately are the recipients of the loans whose success determines the success of government 
economic development policies. The dynamics of power shifted under the new MBO with the 
farmers much more accountable for their farming practices and the ultimate profitability of 
their production. This shifting of the power dynamics inevitably has social repercussions.   
The application of any theoretical framework to a study of banking will provide insights not 
previously uncovered in the application of traditional, statistical or mathematical models. 
While the focus of this paper has been disciplinary surveillance, and an acknowledgement of 
the role of power and knowledge, further research which focuses on other issues relevant to 
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bank lending policies, such as globalisation and international lending, or the political nature 
of banking regulation, will liberate banking researchers from the constrictions of functionalist, 
rationalist boundaries. 
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Figure 1 –The Foucauldian framework applied to the FDB 
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Element Foucault’s interpretation Application to the FDB 
Power A set of techniques and 
disciplinary practices 
The exposure of power in shifting networks of 
alliances within the FDB: between FDB 
officials, tribal chiefs and farmers.    
Knowledge Knowledge increases 
power. The two exist in an 
intertwined relationship 
The exertion of power in lending situations by 
those within the FDB who possess knowledge: 
from the FDB hierarchy through the loans 
officers of the ALD to the chiefs and other 
government officials, and finally the farmers 
Disciplinary 
surveillance 
Those who are without 
power and knowledge are 
subject to those who 
possess power and 
knowledge  
The manner in which FDB loans officers 
conduct disciplinary surveillance on borrowers 
and the way in which FDB structures exert a 
web of discipline over the lending process 
Table 1. Foucault’s concepts applied to the FDB 
 
                                                 
1 These include quantitative models which judge a potential borrower’s ability to repay their debt obligations  
(De Lucia and Peters 1998; Heffernan 1996; Sathye et al 2003; Altman 1989; Koch 1995; Rose and Hudgins 
2005; Saunders 2000; Sinkey 1998; Shanmugam et al 1992; Weaver 1994).   
2 Foucault’s major works are Madness and Civilisation (Foucault 1967), Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison (Foucault 1977a), Nietzsche, Genealogy History (Foucault 1977b).  
3 Tinker’s (2005) scathing attack on Foucauldian studies relied heavily on its supposed deficiencies when 
compared with the notions of state and commodification inherent in the meta-theory of Marxism, with which it 
cannot be compared, given its different “ontological and epistemological foundations” (Scapens 2005, 148). 
4 Some of the studies which have been interpreted by means of Foucault’s concepts include government (Rose 
and Miller 1992; Danaher 1997), colonisation (Sukoharsono and Gaffikin 1993), organisations (Clegg 1979), 
the accounting profession (Booth and Cocks 1990; Willmott 1990; Hoskin and Macve 1986), accounting history 
(Stewart 1992) and accounting systems (Hopwood 1987; Miller and O’Leary 1987).   
5 By 1874, 23% and 28% respectively of the best land on the two main islands had already been sold by the 
Fijian chiefs to Europeans (Ward 1965, 121). The “general colonial discourse promoted the transfer of property 
and extolled the virtues of civilization and competition” (Hooper and Pratt 1995, 15) in New Zealand from the 
late 1800s. This resulted in the transfer of control of 250,000 acres of Maori land to Europeans, at “minimal 
cost”.  
6 At that time, 6,000 land holdings were identified as being held by non-Fijians (Qalo 1984). 
7 Five lease classifications of native land were instituted: agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and 
special lease arrangements (Ward 1965). In 1976 these leases were capped for a maximum of 30 years, 
reinforcing the inevitability of Fijian native ownership (Qalo 1984).  
8 These included beef, copra, cattle, fishing, poultry and general agriculture.  
9 As a result of its lending policy, between the years of 1967 and 1997, the number of loans approved increased 
steadily, from 1967 – 8 (355 approvals) to 1996 – 7 (1,065 approvals), peaking in 1990-1 (3,116 approvals). In 
monetary terms, the highest number of loans occurred in 1991 – 2, when loans amounting to Fijian $15.6 million 
were granted. By 1997, there were total agricultural loans of Fijian $61.4 million outstanding, and the ALD’s 
share of total FDB lending was 46.1% (Fiji Development Bank Annual Reports 1967 – 1997).  
10 The Ra Cane Development Scheme included about 350 clients and in 1986 represented 43% of the Rakiraki 
branch’s agricultural lending portfolio, for a total of Fijian $1.1 million (Fiji Development Bank Annual Report 
1987).  
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11 In the period 1985-86, when the government established a ‘Cane Rehabilitation Project’ (CRP), it  provided 
funds to the FDB, to be passed on to farmers in the sugar-cane industry who had suffered as a result of cyclones 
or drought, during the 1983-84 financial year (Fiji Development Bank Annual Report 1987). 
12 Class J leases came under the reserve category of land. Under this category, no land could be sold or leased to 
a non-Fijian. It has been a policy since the first British governor of Fiji was in power, to keep Fijian land in the 
hands of Fijians, and not with other racial groups (Derrick, 1946). As a result of that policy, the majority of land 
in Fiji is owned by local communities or the government (Lloyd, 1982, p. 27). 
13 Fiji’s development plans have been affected by the three military coups that occurred: two in 1987 and one in 
2000.  
